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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

could be a finding by the jury in response to such suggested issue. 22 Where
loss of memory constitutes the whole defense under a plea of not guilty, it
would seem to follow that error prejudicial to the defendant could not be
claimed as a result of failure of the trial court to volunteer instructions upon
23
an illusive issue of insanity.
The considerable difficulties that arise in criminal cases where insanity
is an issue have not been eased to any great extent by legislative action.
Several notable exceptions, however, have been established. Perhaps the
most practical and sensible treatment of the problem occurs under the "Briggs
Law" 24 in Massachusets where certain classes of offenders are subjected to
a mandatory pre-trial mental examination by a neutral agency. Although
the act exemplifies a stride in the right direction, its limitations necessarily
confine the scope of its effectiveness.25 A procedural improvement has been
enacted in Oregon where the defendant must file a pre-trial notice of his
intention to resort to the defense of insanity.26 Such required notice would
serve to eliminate some technical decisions which tend to confuse and compound the issue of insanity.
PAUL K. PANCRATZ

LABOR LAW-

PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY-FREE

SPEECH.-

At a con-

ference convened to consider a petition for certification of the Longshoreman's Union as exclusive bargaining agent, Respondent stated that its volume
of business during 1948 exceeded $500,000. On the following day the employee who had served as the employee representative at the conference
reported back to the shop committee. Subsequently a rumor was circulated
throughout the plant that Respondent had made a $500,000 profit the pre-

ceding year. Respondent confronted the employee and demanded to know
if he had started this report. The employee was discharged for the alleged
reason that he had deliberately and maliciously lied in stating that the Respondent had made "fantastic earnings." The National Labor Relations Board

found that the employee had not made these statements and that the discharge was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 8 (a) (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act as the employee's conduct was within the scope

of protected concerted activity. Alternatively it was held, even if the employee had made an inaccurate statement, it was not made deliberately or
22. Nickens v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. R. 510, 100 S.W.2d 363 (1936). See Todorow
v. United States, 173 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949) (general rule in criminal cases that
court must instruct jury on all applicable law involved, whether or not he is requested
to do so, does not go beyond the requirements that the court instruct on the principles
of law which the jury should have in order to decide the factual issues presented).
23. Walls v. State, 142 Neb. 748, 7 N.W.2d 709 (1943) (where defendant's evidence
was that his mind was a complete blank during the period when the crime was committed,
refusal of instruction to acquit him if the jury had reasonable doubt as to his mental
capacity was not prejudicial error). However, in this case capital punishment was not
involved. Courts usually go to far greater lengths to protect the defendant, where the
death penalty is involved.
24. Mass. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 123, Sec. 100A.
25. See, Weihofen, Insanity As A Defense In Criminal Law, 405-6 (1933).
26. Ore. Code Ann. §26-846 (1930) "...
Where the defendant . . . purposes to
show . . . that he was insane . . . he shall . . . file a written notice of his purpose . . .
If the defendant fails to file any such notice he shall not be entitled to introduce
evidence. ...."

RECENT CASES

maliciously, hence it was immaterial that the Respondent may have acted
upon a good faith belief that the employee was responsible for the rumor.
American Shuffleboard Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1951). On appeal to the Circuit Court enforcement of the Board's order was decreed. Cusano v. N.L.R.B.,
190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951).1

The policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to protect concerted
action for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 2 To implement this policy the Board through administrative remedies protects employees from discrimination in regard to. hire or tenure of
employment which discourages membership in a labor organization. 3 Whether
any particular action in the form of conduct or statements is within the guaranteed employee right of self-organization is dependent upon its falling within the ambit of "protected" concerted action. To be protected concerted
action it must have a proper "objective" 4 and this objective must be sought
through proper "means." 5 Employee statements seeking to inform fellow
employees about the progress of a representation proceeding involving themselves is so directly connected with the collective bargaining process as to
be a proper objective.6 Restriction upon this process by the employer seeking to dictate the employee participants in the collective bargaining process
has been held to be an interference with the employees right of self-organization.7 Likewise, the employer is not dependent upon the union to communicate the progress in collective bargaining negotiations to the employees but
is privileged to state its own case. 8 It is conceded that the objective of the
conduct may be so remote from the collective bargaining process to be outside the range of protected concerted activity.9 Assuming the appropriate1. Paul Cusano, Louis
Shuffleboard Co., etc.

Cusano

and

others,

limited

partners,

trading

as

American

2. This section, numbered §7, in the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), which was
incorporated into the Taft-Hartley Act without change, 61 Stat. 140, §7 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §157 (Supp. 1949) provides that "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
All citations to
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .
sections refer to the amended Act unless otherwise specified.
3. Section 8 (a) (3).
4. The American News Company Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). See Labor Board
v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 339 (1939).
5. N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945).
6. Cusano v. N.L.R.B., 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951). The Bettcher Manufacturing Corp.,
76 N.L.R.B. 526, 535 (1948) "To be protected, it would appear that statements
by employees during bargaining conferences must be addressed to or have some
reasonable bearing on the bargainable issues; otherwise, they would have an insufficient
relation to the bargaining process to be termed "collective activity" since the collective
activity protected by the Act in such a situation is the bargaining process."
7. See, e.g., The Elwell-Parker Electric Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 1046, 1053 (1948);
Bingler Motors, Inc., 30 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1085 (1941); Also see the correlative right in
§8 (b) (1) B "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents to restrain or coerce an employer in the selection of his representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances."
8. N.L.R.B. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1944); N.L.R.B. v.
American Tube Bend. Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943).
9. In N.L.R.B. v. Reynolds Internat. Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947), the
employees struck over the demotion of a foreman. The Court, reversing the Board, held
that this was not legitimate concerted activity, that the demotion of the foreman was a
"prerogative of management" and those who struck in protest would lose their status as
employees under the Act. Here the employees were not as interested in their conditions
of employment as they were in the welfare of their foreman. If their interest had been
more personal, the decision might have been different. In Fontaine Converting Works,
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ness of the objective, the conduct may become unprotected as a result of the
means through which it is sought. Thus, economic benefits which might be
legitimately sought through the economic pressure of a lawful strike, 0 may
become unlawful when sought through an illegal sit-down strike."
This
case presents the question of whether the accepted double barreled criteria
used to test conduct which is protected activity is applicable to test what
statements are protected. The opinion of the Board in the instant case suggests only where the misstatement was deliberately and maliciously made,
and not where inaccurate through honest mistake, would employee disciplinary action lie and not be violative of the Act.' 2 The court evaded the
issue as to the effect of maliciously made misstatements.
To limit protected statements to those which do not reflect malicious intent may be inconsistent with the policy of the amended Act13 to extend
the legitimate area of discussion which permits two of the participants in
the labor relations arena to make statements with immunity so long as they
1
are not in themselves coercive. 4 However, the instant case indicates a more
-igorous limitation by making employee intent a relevant factor in determining the area of protected statements.
EVERETT

V. HAMMARSTROM

Inc. 77 N.L.R.B. 1886, (1948), the employees walked out when their foreman was not
promoted to a higher supervisory position. The Board said their conduct violated the
Act because it was not "reasonably related to conditions of employment."
They were
primarily concerned with the success of the foreman; hence it was regarded as a friendly
gesture and only of indirect interest. The Board found that the employees walked out,
not to advance their own interests, but merely to further the interests of their foreman
who they believed was demoted because of the appointment of a new general foreman.
The concerted activity was not protected by the Act. See 50 Col: L. Rev. 351 (1950);
-44 II. L. Rev. 234 (1949); 58 Yale L.J. 803 (1949).
10. Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
11. Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). Here the strike was illegal
in its inception and prosecution. It was an illegal seizure of' the buildings in order. to
prevent their use by the employer in a lawful manner and thus by acts of force and
violence to compel the employer to submit. When the employees resorted to that sort
-of compulsion they took a position outside the protection of the statute and accepted the
risk of the termination of their employment upon grounds aside from the exercise of
the legal rights which the statute was designed to conserve.
12. American Shuffleboard Company, 92 N.L.R.B. 1272, 1274 (1951): "even assuming
that Paladino had made a false (but not deliberately or maliciously false) report to
the shop committee that Respondent had made "fantastic earnings,"
and that the
Respondent had discharged him because he had made such a false report, such a
-discharge would still have been unlawful." Contra: N.L.R.B. v. Atlantic Towing Co., 180
F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950) (where the Court found that the employee made a false
statement that the Company was guilty of an unfair labor practice, the Company had
the right to discharge the employee for this statement, irrespective of whether employee
knew or did not know that it was false).
13. Section 8 (c) provides that "the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion,
-or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
14. N.L.R.B. v. Brown-Brockmeyer Co., 143 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1944): "The right
of free speech does not depend upon the accuracy of the ideas expressed"; Essex Rubber
Co., Inc., 50 N.L.R.B. 283, 291 (1943)
(an employer's unproved accusation, during
a collective bargaining conference, in the presence of employees, that the union representative was corrupt, even though "ill-advised," did not constitute an unfair labor practice
because, it was made "during a heated argument" in the course of collective bargaining
:negotiations).

